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THE DOMESTICATION OF GERMAN
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
John Kincaid*

N The Allocation of Competences: Foreign Relations Between the European Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, Professor Torsten Stein provides a rich, analytic overview of both the law and the
reality of Germany's foreign-relations competences in the context of the
European Union and the recent changes in the Basic Law. His analysis is
both insightful and provocative. At the same time, he paints a rather
stark portrait of a Germany virtually denuded of its sovereignty with respect to foreign policy. In essence, he argues that foreign-policy powers
have been gradually siphoned out of the German Federal Government in
two directions: toward the European Union and toward the Lander. The
Federal Government has been left wearing little more than a ceremonial
cape.
If a true foreign policy needs a respected army, then perhaps this portrait is accurate. Today, however, a true foreign policy, for a democracy
at least, needs an air force as well as a naval platform, from which to
launch aircraft and cruise missiles, more than it needs an army. Democratic peoples no longer tolerate massive casualties among their military
personnel absent a direct threat to the polity itself. However, if one defines foreign relations in terms of diplomatic leadership buttressed by economic muscle, then the portrait of German foreign policy during the
past years is surely more robust, if not exactly colorful, and far more fruitful than during the first fifty years of the twentieth century.
Furthermore, as Stein notes, since 1945 Germany has conducted its foreign policy under somewhat unique institutional constraints. These constraints have included rules that the Allied occupation imposed after the
war, followed by the more institutionalized constraints associated with
NATO, the European Community (EC) and European Union (EU),
other European institutions, and international law. Indeed, as Stein suggests, by the time the reunited Germany achieved full sovereignty under
the treaty of 1990, Germany was already embedded in and constrained by
the well-developed institutional structures of NATO and Western Europe
itself. In effect, Germany became sovereign, not in and of itself, but in
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partnership with these institutions. This notion of partnership is critical
because these European institutions are not entirely external.
Germany is a part of these institutions, and is often a powerful part. It
played a leading and dominant role in building those institutions. Germany, therefore, is not autarkic, but neither is any other European nation
today. No nation-state is autarkic.
An important characteristic of German foreign policy since 1949 has
been Germany's willingness to conduct foreign relations mostly within
rather than outside of, or in opposition to, these multinational institutions. Germany has rarely acted unilaterally, at least in major ways.
There have been some exceptions, such as Germany's early recognition of
Croatia. But Germany has largely been, or has tried to be, a partner. Its
overall approach to the Balkans has been to try to forge a European solution that would give European institutions priority in policy-making, with
the United States occupying a secondary position. Thus, Germany's foreign relations appears to be a desirable model that moves humanity away
from older notions of national autarky and international anarchy, toward
a more domesticated and rule-bound model of global intergovernmental
relations. As such, Germany has also acted in constructive ways to help
build the very institutions that constrain national autarky and international anarchy.
The powers Western Europe's multinational institutions now exercise,
therefore, precipitates an inquiry of whether it is meaningful to describe
the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the EU
as "foreign relations" or whether they should be described as "intergovernmental domestic relations." The Lander asserted this point during negotiations over the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The
Ltinder argued that EU matters were no longer questions of foreign relations under Article 32(1) of the Basic Law, and that the EU was no
longer an international organization for the purposes of Article 24(1).1
One need not accept the argument that member-state relations with and
within the EU are simply the functional equivalent of domestic relations.
But they are not simply "foreign relations" either, and the EU is not
merely an international organization. Intergovernmental relations in the
EU have a hybrid character containing elements familiar to both students
of intergovernmental relations in foreign affairs and to students of intergovernmental relations in domestic federalism.
Article 24(1) may be used as a vehicle for the siphoning of nation-state
powers into multinational European institutions and the EU. The Linder
regarded Article 24(1) as the "open flank" of the federal system.
Through the open flank of its foreign-relations competence, the Federal
Government would be able to destroy the fundamental federal principles
of the Basic Law in ways the Basic Law otherwise prohibited domestically. The hinder believed that if they could not close the open flank of
1.

GRUNDGESETZ

[Constitution] [GG] arts. 32(1), 24(1) (F.R.G.).
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Article 24(1), an army of Brussels bureaucrats would march through it
and occupy more and more Land powers, thus wrecking the federal
system.
During the first three decades of European integration, the Federal
Government repeatedly promised to consult the Land governments in advance on all matters affecting the Lander. The Federal Government frequently did consult with the Lander, although European decision-making
during those decades rarely had significant effects on Lnder competences. Negotiations leading up to the Single European Act of 19862 and,
then, to the Maastricht Treaty, however, triggered alarms in the Linder.
These measures essentially transformed the EC and EU into a functional
federation without substantially altering its confederal decision-making
structure in which executive heads of national states and governments
dominate. Like a confederation, heads of state and government still
make all the important decisions of the EU. Yet, like a federation, EU
decisions directly affect individuals and, thereby, an ever-widening range
of Land competences. Therefore, during 1985-1987, the Linder began
opening their own information and liaison offices in Brussels. They
pressed for a stronger voice through the Bundesrat in European decisionmaking and ultimately insisted on changing the Basic Law.
In 1987, the Lander issued Ten Munich Theses on European Policy,
which included four key demands with respect to European integration.
The first was entrenchment of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty. Although accomplished, this effort fails to truly protect the Lander. Subsidiarity applies to the member-states, not to their regional and local
governments, and is left to member-state decision-making. A second demand was to open the Council of Ministers to "third level" ministers on
matters of exclusive subnational responsibility. The Lander achieved this
part. On EU matters affecting exclusive Linder competences, a Linder
representative can chair the German delegation in the Council of Ministers. A third demand to sub-national regions was, moreover, not unique
to Germany. Alongside European integration, and partly because of this
integration, a number of countries, such as Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom, have experienced devolution, decentralization, or federalization. Federalist concepts of polycentric or multi-level governance
and domestic asymmetry are replacing older statist concepts of unitary
sovereignty and domestic symmetry. A fourth demand was to establish a
right of "third level" governments to appeal to the European Court of
Justice any regulations of the EU Council or Commission that infringe
upon "third level" powers. This was not accomplished, although the government of the federal republic agreed to represent Linder interests
before the court.
The issues arising from this double siphoning process have been, perhaps, more visible in Germany because of its fifty-year-old federal sys2. See Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986.
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tem, which has long enabled the Lander to impose certain internal
constraints on the conduct of German foreign relations. These constraints were partly external in origin, insofar as the Allied occupying
powers urged the establishment of a decentralized political system. However, a federal republic, in which powers are both divided and shared
between the federation and the Linder, became possible and viable because federal-type arrangements were already rooted in German history.
At the time, few, if any, political leaders had a coherent vision of the
future, but the postwar arrangements pointed, in effect, to a United
States of Germany within a United States of Europe. Indeed, paragraph
2 of the Preamble to the Basic Law commits the Federal Republic to
' '3
serving "world peace as an equal part of a united Europe.
Stein argues that as Europe has become more united, the foreign-relations competences of the Lander have been strengthened. He also cites
changes in the Basic Law that strengthen Linder powers in foreign relations. He implies, however, that this development is illegitimate. The
new Article 23 that was added to the Basic Law was "the result," he says,
"of a successful blackmail on the part of the Linder. ' '4 This is a very
provocative statement that provokes a few comments in support of the
Linder.
The Lander sought changes in the Basic Law in return for their support
for the Maastricht Treaty because the policy competences of thc EU increasingly invade the historic powers of the Linder over areas such as
health, education, job training, culture, the media, the environment, technology, research, and regional structural policy. Thus, the Linder faced a
siphoning challenge. Under its authority to delegate competences and
establish an institution for regiouns withing the EU, the federal government could have sucked dry both the autonomous powers and the implementation powers that the Basic Law guaranteed the Linder. The
Committee of the Regions, although only an advisory body, achieved this
and the Linder must now sit at the table alongside bureaucratic functionaries from regions in some countries that are patently unequivalent to the
German Lander.
Internally, however, Article 23 was a significant political achievement
for the Linder. Paragraph 1 reaffirms the integrity of the federal system,
provides the Linder with a stronger and more direct voice in EU decision-making, and requires, through Article 79, a two-thirds vote in both
the Bundesrat and Bundestag on transfers of competences to the EU that
would alter the Basic Law or make such changes legislatively possible.5
This is similar, in principle, to the two-thirds vote needed to ratify treaties
in the U.S. Senate. States in the United States were concerned, among
other things, that the treaty power could become an open flank for invad3. GG preamble.
4. Torsten Stein, The Allocation of Competences: Foreign Relations Between the European Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 SMU L. REV. 505 (2000).
5. GG art. 23(1).
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ing state powers. Today, though, the United States government avoids
treaties as much as possible, preferring instead to enter agreements that
require only simple majority votes in both houses of Congress, or executive agreements that require no congressional consent. Surely Article 23
of the Basic Law will be subject to creative interpretation as well.
Even if one accepts the argument that the Linder blackmailed the German Federal Government or sought to buy concessions in return for
agreement to the Maastricht Treaty, the result was mostly consistent with
German constitutional policy and political tradition. The new Article 23
was necessitated, in part, by the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court to reject a challenge to the Maastricht Treaty while, at the
same time, opining about the need for domestic federal democratic mechanisms to oversee Germany's participation in European integration and
the EU's use of delegated competences. In light of the increasingly domestic character of EU decision-making, Article 23 is also consistent with
the tradition of Land participation in national policy-making-including
the pre-Article 23 fact that more than half of all federal laws could not be
enacted without support from a majority of the Land governments' votes
in the Bundesrat. Article 23 is also consistent with the traditional intergovernmental sharing of legislative, fiscal, and administrative functions
that produced a system of interlocking politics characteristic of cooperative federalism despite the centralizing features of the Basic Law embedded in a culture that has emphasized national unity and equal living
conditions nationwide. It is possible that the Linder will use their power
to extract concessions from the Federal Government; however, their interest in fostering European integration is likely to limit their eagerness
to do so.
From this perspective, Article 24(1)(a) on transfrontier cooperation
with neighboring regions is not really an enhancement of Land foreignrelations powers either. Germany's neighbors are, or will become, members of the EU, and most transfrontier institutions deal with domestic
housekeeping matters. In this case, the Federal Government must approve Land transfers of sovereign powers to transfrontier institutions.
The constituent governments of most federal systems already possessed
this power in varying degrees. States in the United States have possessed
this power for 211 years under the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 6 but until recent decades, states seldomly used it. States cannot
enter treaties with foreign governments, but with the consent of Congress
they can enter compacts and agreements with foreign governments.
Furthermore, regarding Article 32(3) on Land treaties, Professor Stein
notes that the German Federal Government rarely refuses to give its consent to such treaties.7 Whether Article 24(1)(a) was really necessary considering that the Basic Law already had Article 32(3) is perhaps an open
question; nevertheless, Land foreign-relations powers have not been sig6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c. 3.

7. See supra note 4.
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nificantly enhanced. In the United States, Congress rarely addresses
state agreements with foreign governments, and states often enter agreements without informing Congress or the U.S. Department of State.
These transfrontier tools available to the Lander under the Basic Law
are also important because economic development and competition in
the EU are significantly shifting from member nation-states to regions
within the member states. Consequently, vigorous and competent Land
policy-making on infrastructure, education, and other facets of economic
development is increasingly vital to Germany's economy and to its muscle in the EU. The Linder, therefore, often cooperates directly with the
European Commission on economic development and cohesion policies.
One potential problem for Germany, however, is that the Linder with
greater abilities to compete in the European and global markets will
leave the poorer Lander behind. This could produce divisions among the
Lander about EU policy-making and place greater pressure on the Federal Government to compensate the poorer Lander through strengthened
equalization policies.
In summary, have these developments, which stem from European integration, increased the Lnder foreign-relations competences? The answer is "yes," if one views the EU as an international organization. If one
views the EU as something else, a confederal federation perhaps, the answer is "no." From this perspective, the Lander did not increase their
foreign-relations competences: rather, they sought to maintain their domestic competences and their constitutional roles in the federal decisionmaking processes.
Finally, it should be noted that the challenges facing the Lander and
German federalism are not peculiar to Germany. Such challenges confront all federal systems as a result of globalization and, especially, freetrade agreements. These agreements, which now increasingly seek to
eliminate non-tariff trade barriers, pose serious challenges to the constitutional powers of the constituent governments of all federal systems. In
most federal systems, the constituent governments exercise most of the
powers that can give rise to non-tariff trade barriers. Indeed, the EU has
a list of more than 100 U.S. state laws to which it has free-trade objections. The challenges are more acute in Germany because of the deeper
and more comprehensive nature of European integration compared to
the challenges faced, for example, by U.S. states and Canadian provinces
under the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade
Organization. The constituent governments in all federations, and even
sub-national governments in some unitary systems, are already asserting
rights to have a stronger voice in national foreign policy-making and to
have an independent presence in the international arena. Consequently,
the constitutional and political developments that the Lander initiated in
Germany are precursors of, and perhaps models for, developments likely
to occur in other federal systems as global integration affects more and
more domestic policy-making.

